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Abstract:  We consider how industries use front groups to com-
bat public health measures by relating the history of “Get Govern-
ment Off Our Back”, a coalition created by the tobacco industry 
to fight government regulation. Using tobacco industry docu-
ments, contemporaneous media reports, journal articles, and 
press releases, we review the establishment by RJ Reynolds of an 
industry front group, Get Government Off Our Back (GGOOB) in 
1994. The group’s goal was to advocate against U.S. federal regu-
lation of tobacco. By keeping its involvement secret, RJ Reynolds 
was able to draw public and legislative support toward limiting 
government regulation of tobacco without having to address 
the tobacco industry’s reputation for misrepresenting evidence. 
Unfortunately, the tobacco industry’s use of front groups is not 
unique; other industries use front groups to fight measures desi-
gned to protect public health. Research on the background and 
funding of advocacy organizations could help identify industry 
front groups and make them less useful to their creators.
1. Introduction
This paper describes the formation of a tobacco industry front 
group Get Government Off Our Back (GGOOB) created to fight 
proposed tobacco regulation by the US Food and Drug Adminis-
tration (FDA) and the Occupational Health and Safety Adminis-
tration (OSHA) in 1994–1995. The tobacco industry has a history 
of misrepresenting scientific evidence (Bero et al., 1994a, 1994b, 
1995, 2001), attempting to influence government through lob-
bying (Givel and Glantz, 2001; Glantz and Begay, 1994; Glantz et 
al., 1996; Monardi and Glantz, 1998), and is responsible for over 
440,000 deaths annually in the United States (U.S. Department 
of Health and Human Services, 2004). These factors have com-
promised the tobacco industry’s reputation and made associ-
ation with its interests a political liability (Burson-Marstellar, 
1986; Harris Poll, 1999; Roper Center, 1999, 2000a and 2000b). 
The creation of a seemingly independent organization advan-
taged the tobacco industry by presenting its anti-regulation 
agenda as an expression of popular will.
The goals of the front group created by RJ Reynolds in 1994 
were not overtly tobacco-related. Political decision makers 
discount the activities of organizations that are obviously self-
interested (Bodensteiner, 1997; Calvert, 1985; Lohmann, 1993; 
Lyon and Maxwell, 2004; Potters and van Winden, 1992; San-
chez, 1996), such as “smokers’ rights” groups (Lohmann, 1993; 
Potters and van Winden, 1992). Many firms have an incentive 
to deceive policymakers, especially about their sponsorship of 
lobbying activities (Lyon and Maxwell, 2004; Wright, 1996), and 
creating a front group that appears to be broad-based makes 
this possible (Becker, 1983; Lohmann, 1993).
Organizations learn from each other (Apollonio and La 
Raja, 2004; March and Olson, 1984), and RJ Reynolds’ success 
with GGOOB is consistent with the activities of other industries: 
pharmaceutical manufacturers, telecommunications firms, 
and credit unions have engaged in similar efforts (Mitchell, 
2002; Public Citizen, 2001). The history of GGOOB provides in-
sight for researchers and policymakers that may help forestall 
future misrepresentation by industry interest groups.
2. Data and methods
In conjunction with legal settlements between 46 state Attor-
neys General and the major tobacco companies in the United 
States, over 40 million pages of internal tobacco industry docu-
ments have been made publicly available (Bero, 2003; Kelder, 
1999; TDO, 2005; UCSF Library, 2005). We used these documents 
to determine RJ Reynolds’ motivation for creating Get Govern-
ment Off Our Back (GGOOB). Using established techniques for 
systematically searching tobacco documents archives (Malone 
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and Balbach, 2000), we identified over 3000 internal tobacco 
industry documents pertaining to FDA and OSHA regulation, 
Get Government Off Our Back, and the organizations that clai-
med to sponsor it (other than RJ Reynolds). We also reviewed se-
condary data sources for corroborating information. We drew 
on approximately 200 documents, dated from 1993 to 1997, to 
prepare this paper.
3. Results
3.1 Organizational creation and development
The inspiration for GGOOB appears to have been drawn from a 
print advertisement run by RJ Reynolds (see Tab. 1 for timeline). 
The ad appeared in June of 1994 in newspapers around the Uni-
ted States and showed a man standing in front of a pickup truck 
and looking out at the reader (Fig. 1). The text read, “I’m one of 
America’s 45 million smokers. I’m not a moaner or a whiner. 
But I’m getting fed up. I’d like to get government off my back.” 
The advertisement claimed that smoking restrictions were a 
smokescreen by a government determined to control individu-
al behavior by banning cigarettes, followed by “liquor and fast 
food and buttermilk” (RJ Reynolds, 1994 and 1995).
In October of 1994, the public relations firm Mongoven, Bis-
coe and Duchin (MBD) proposed the creation of an ad hoc coa-
lition to “Get Government Off Our Back” (Duchin and Blumel, 
1994). Get Government Off Our Back (referred to in industry 
documents as GGOOB) (Carter et al., 2002; Duchin and Blumel, 
1994) was created to combat increasing numbers of proposed 
federal and state regulations on the use and sale of tobacco 
 products. The coalition was intended to have popular support 
and as a result it relied on existing groups recruited by RJ Rey-
nolds (Philip Morris, 1993). 
Although the creation and development of GGOOB was fun-
ded by RJ Reynolds through MBD, the company itself was never 
publicly identified as a sponsor (Newsradio, 1994; PR Newswire, 
1995a and 1995b). The first press release for the organization 
appeared in October 1994, and noted that a number of North 
Carolina groups had decided to join the GGOOB coalition (Tab. 
2). It claimed that these groups had all joined the coalition as 
part of a “grass roots movement responding to the belief of 
many Americans that our government, at all levels, is growing 
out of control”. In addition, it introduced the GGOOB resoluti-
on, which demanded that elected officials “reduce the size of 
government and the number of needless regulations at all le-
vels of government” (Get Government Off Our Back, 1994).
Tab. 1 Timeline of events: FDA and OSHA proposed regulation, GGOOB mobilization, and legislative activity.
Date Event 
February 1994 –  The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) announces its intention to regulate tobacco as a drug, begins investiga-
tion into whether cigarette manufacturers designed their products to take advantage of the pharmacological ef-
fects of nicotine (FDA Tobacco Rules, 1997; Kessler et al., 1996).
April 1994 –  The Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA) announces a proposed rule regulating indoor air 
quality in workplaces that allow smoking (Jeffress, 1988).
June 1994 –  RJ Reynolds runs „I‘d like to get government off my back“ advertisement in national print media (RJ Reynolds, 1994 
and 1995a).
September 1994 –  OSHA begins hearings on its proposed rule, which eventually draw over 115,000 comments (Jeffress, 1988), most of 
which were solicited by the tobacco industry (SCARC, 1995).
October 1994 –  Mongoven, Biscoe and Duchin (MBD) proposes the creation of an ad hoc „Get Government Off Our Back“ 
coalition (Duchin and Blumel, 1994).
–  First identified press release for “Get Government Off Our Back” (North Carolina); introduces “GGOOB resolution” 
(Get Government Off Our Back, 1994).
Beginning of 1995 –  GGOOB sponsoring organizations modified to suggest a national focus; tobacco organizations no longer listed  
(Get Government Off Our Back, 1995a).
February 1995 –  US House passes a moratorium on new federal regulation as part of the Republican “Contract with America” 
 (Associated Press, 1995a and 1995b; News, 1995; News 4 Texas, 1995).
March 1995 –  GGOOB designates March as „Regulatory Revolt Month“ and organizes rallies in 12 states (Get Government Off  
Our Back, 1995c).
– US Senate debates moratorium on new federal regulation (comparable to US House bill) 
– OSHA hearings closed 
April 1995 – MBD writes followup memo regarding GGOOB to RJ Reynolds and proposes additional mobilization (Duchin, 1995).
August 1995 – Draft FDA rule announced; proposes restrictions on advertising to minors (Kessler et al., 1996; Jeffress, 1988).
– OSHA followup hearings closed
January 1996 – OSHA comment period closed
December 2001 – OSHA withdraws proposed rule (Roy, 2001).
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Although the initial coalition was made up largely of 
 tobacco growers and distributors (Get Government Off Our 
Back, 1995a), by 1995 the roster of supporting organizations 
had changed. The new “sponsors” appeared to consist only of 
ideologically motivated groups without obvious tobacco con-
nections (Get Government Off Our Back, 1995a). There is limi-
ted information on tobacco industry contributions to these 
organizations, but at least 18 (46 %) received financial support 
from the tobacco industry, and three more (8 %) were spun off 
from tobacco-funded groups (Allen, 1962; American Tobacco 
Company, 1988, 1991; Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence, 
2005; Brown and Williamson, 1985; Caldwell, 1969; Center for 
Media and Democracy, 2004 and 2005a–2005h; Cherry, 1985; 
Covington and Burling, 1990; Eply Associates, 1995; Hyde, 
1994, 1995r; Kornegay, 1977; Lai, 1995; Lorillard, 1990a, 1990b, 
1999, 2001; Marden, 1998; Masks of Deception, 1991; Mozingo, 
1989; Nicoli, 1998; North Carolina Department of Revenue, 
1999; North Carolina Tobacco Foundation, 1982; Oglesby, 1993; 
Oliver and Grange, 1985; Payne, 2000; Payne and Walker, 1998; 
Philip Morris, 1995, 1997, 1998a, 1998b, 1999, 1999b; Proactive 
Communications, 1999; RJ Reynolds, 1995c; Ridenour, 1998; 
Tobacco Institute, ---, 1991, 1992, 1997, 1999; Tobacco Tax 
 Council, 1981; Violence Policy Center, 1997; Weber, 1997; Wells, 
1983). These groups also received support from other industries 
 (Center for Media and Democracy, 2005a–2005h).
Throughout the creation and development of GGOOB, the 
decision of RJ Reynolds and MBD to create the group was never 
mentioned. Instead, organizers claimed the group was created 
to protect small business, because larger firms “often welcome 
new regulations because they know the regulations will help 
consolidate their market share and wipe out small business 
competitors” (Kerrigan, 1994). GGOOB literature claimed the 
group was formed, “Because of the growing number of cases 
of government waste and abuse nationwide, civic groups and 
other organizations have already been forming all over the 
country to respond to the problem. So the strength of this mo-
vement is, and will remain, at the grass-roots level. It’s only be-
cause the problem is becoming so prevalent that it is pushing 
its way into the national spotlight” (Get Government Off Our 
Back, 1995b). 
3.2 Organizational activities
By 1995, GGOOB began to organize events designed to draw 
popular support. The organization designated March 1995 as 
“Regulatory Revolt Month” and organized anti-regulation ral-
lies in twelve states (Get Government Off Our Back, 1995c). Using 
these rallies, lobbyists for RJ Reynolds were able to contact sta-
te legislators without their necessarily realizing that they were 
speaking to tobacco industry representatives (Gallant, 1995a; 
Gomez, 1995; Terry, 1995). Contemporaneous media reports 
claimed several of these legislators signed the GGOOB resoluti-
on suggesting a moratorium on all new government regulation 
(Hyde, 1995a–1995d). The GGOOB resolution dovetailed with the 
goals of the newly Republican-led US House of Representatives 
and its Contract with America, and in 1995 the House passed a 
bill that froze new federal regulations, and demanded that in 
the future no “unnecessary” federal regulations be allowed. 
This text matched the GGOOB resolution nearly verbatim (Asso-
ciated Press, 1995a and 1995b; News, 1995; News 4 Texas, 1995).
In April of 1995, Mongoven, Biscoe and Duchin wrote a fol-
low-up memo regarding GGOOB to RJ Reynolds executives. In 
it, they noted that their objective was “to mobilize national and 
state-level resources to oppose regulations and legislation that 
is in opposition to RJR’s interests … most important at this time 
is to expand on and use more effectively the elements that are 
already in place, specifically GGOOB” (Duchin, 1995). They no-
ted plans to continue recruitment of outside organizations to 
oppose regulations through the coalition (Duchin, 1995; Gal-
lant, 1995; Miller, 1995a and 1995b; Walton and Kenneth, 1994). 
Although GGOOB advocated for reduced regulation of all busi-
Fig. 1 RJ Reynolds “Get Government Off My Back” Advertisement, June 
1994.
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ness, it chose to focus primarily on regulations restricting smo-
king indoors (Get Government Off Our Back, 1995d).
By this time, GGOOB itself had become well known enough 
that some organizations sought out membership in the coali-
tion without being solicited (Hyde, 1995e and 1995f; Griscom, 
1995). The GGOOB rallies drew substantial press attention at the 
national and state levels (Hyde, 1995b–1995i; Hoy, 1995; Padali-
no, 1995). Throughout late 1994 and 1995, internal RJ Reynolds 
documents listed developing GGOOB groups and encouraging 
them to communicate “grassroots” anti-regulatory positions 
to government as a continuing priority (RJ Reynolds, 1995a–
1995d). RJ Reynolds viewed GGOOB as a more politically pala-
table extension of company lobbying efforts, choosing to send 
GGOOB allies rather than its own lobbyists to advocate against 
excise taxes, clean indoor air, and tobacco control in general 
(Gallant, 1995a; Hyde, 1995i; Hyde, 1995j–1995p and 2002).
Tab. 2 Get Government Off Our Back listed members, 1994 and 1995 [Notes: (a) Tobacco industry; (b) Organization funded by the tobacco industry; 
(c) Organization spun off from a group funded by the tobacco industry (Allen, 1962; American Tobacco Company, 1988, 1991; Brady Center to Prevent 
Gun Violence, 2005; Brown and Williamson, 1985; Caldwell, 1969; Center for Media and Democracy, 2004 and 2005a–2005h; Cherry, 1985; Covington 
and Burling, 1990; Eply Associates, 1995; Hyde, 1994, 1995r; Kornegay, 1977; Lai, 1995; Lorillard, 1990a, 1990b, 1999, 2001; Marden,1998; Masks of 
Deception, 1991; Mozingo, 1989; Nicoli, 1998; North Carolina Department of Revenue, 1999; North Carolina Tobacco Foundation, 1982; Oglesby, 1993; 
Oliver and Grange, 1985; Payne, 2000; Payne and Walker, 1998; Philip Morris, 1995, 1997, 1998a, 1998b, 1999, 1999b; Proactive Communications, 1999; 
RJ Reynolds, 1995c; Ridenour, 1998; Tobacco Institute, ---, 1991, 1992, 1997, 1999; Tobacco Tax Council, 1981; Violence Policy Center, 1997; Weber, 1997; 
Wells, 1983). These groups also received support from other industries (Center for Media and Democracy, 2005a–2005h)]. 
1994 GGOOB listed members (North Carolina) 1995 GGOOB listed members (national) 
Bright Belt Warehouse Association a Alliance for America
Jerry Williams, N.C. Restaurant Association American Legislative Exchange Council b
John Locke Foundation b American Rental Association
N.C. Convenience Store Association Americans for Tax Reform b
N.C. Grange Mutual Insurance Company Association of Concerned Taxpayers
N.C. Taxpayers United b Center for the Defense of Free Enterprise
N.C. Wholesalers Association a Christian Voters League
North Carolina State Grange a Citizens for a Sound Economy b
Southern Association of Wholesale Distributors a Competitive Enterprise Institute b
Tobacco Growers Association of North Carolina a Concerned Women for America Legislative Action Committee
Tobacco Growers Information Committee a Consumer Alert b
Council for Citizens Against Government Waste b
Council for Government Reform
Defenders of Property Rights b
Environmental Policy Task Force c
Heartland Institute b
Home School Legal Defense Association
Institute for Justice b
International Foodservice Distributors Association
Law Enforcement Alliance of America c
National American Wholesale Grocers‘ Association
National Association of Convenience Stores b
National Association of Wholesale Distributors
National Center for Public Policy Research b
National Grange a
National Rifle Association b
National Tax Limitation Committee b
National Wilderness Institute
Project 21 b
Small Business of America
Small Business Survival Committee b
Square One
Stewards of Family Farms, Ranches, and Forests
The Seniors Coalition b
Traditional Values Coalition
U.S. Chamber of Commerce b
U.S. Term Limits c
United States Business and Industrial Council
Western Forest Industries Association
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By August of 1995, RJ Reynolds had nearly completely in-
tegrated its use of GGOOB in its political activities. Individuals 
affiliated with GGOOB signed op-eds written by RJ Reynolds un-
der their own names, forwarded RJ Reynolds’ position papers 
to other groups, and advocated independently against tobacco 
regulation (Carter, 1995; Hyde, 1995; RJ Reynolds, 1995g). One 
tobacco industry lobbyist “wearing his GGOOB hat” cited the 
FDA regulation of tobacco as “a perfect example of excessive 
regulation and big, expensive government run amok” (RJ Rey-
nolds, 1995h).
As the threat of wide reaching FDA and OSHA regulation 
receded, RJ Reynolds reduced its commitment to GGOOB. By 
the beginning of 1996, RJ Reynolds external relations docu-
ments no longer referred to it. It is not clear, however, whether 
 there was any formal decision made to disband the coalition. 
RJ Reynolds may have decided that having GGOOB’s history 
and funding exposed was a political risk. The relatively short 
time period during which GGOOB existed meant that there 
was little investigation that might have identified its cha-
racter.
GGOOB was clearly a pure industry front group throughout 
its history; RJ Reynolds and a public relations firm were entirely 
responsible for its creation, organization, activities and main-
tenance (Duchin and Blumel, 1994; Duchin, 1995; Hyde, 1995q). 
Many of the organizations involved were financially compen-
sated for their participation (Center for Media and Democracy, 
2005a–2000h). GGOOB drew popular support from the public 
and from legislators, gathered extensive press attention for to-
bacco industry political positions, and assisted in derailing two 
proposed regulations of workplace smoking and tobacco sales. 
These accomplishments were contingent on the fact that the 
media did not realize the organization was an industry front 
group (Bodensteiner, 1997).
4. Discussion
RJ Reynolds’ development of GGOOB suggests that industries 
may be successful in blocking legislation and regulation by de-
veloping allied organizations that are not obviously connected 
to their issues. During the two-year period that GGOOB was 
active, there was little discussion of how a new organization 
managed to fund multiple events, widely publicize them (in 
at least one case, with an airplane flying overhead trailing the 
coalition’s logo) (Hyde, 1995), and make its agenda a top prio-
rity for a range of existing national advocacy groups. Asking 
these questions might have revealed RJ Reynolds’ involvement 
in generating GGOOB from little more than a substantial lob-
bying budget.
The history of GGOOB suggests that policymakers, ad-
vocates, and the media should be cautious in accepting the 
claims of groups that purport to reflect popular disaffection. 
Existing research on public relations notes that media investi-
gation of organizational sponsors has limited the effectiveness 
of front groups (Bodensteiner, 1997; Sanchez, 1996), and notes 
that requiring industries to disclose all of their political activity 
would also reduce the value of front groups to industry (Lyon 
and Maxwell, 2004). The limited attention to organizational 
sponsorship is surprising given that nearly ninety percent of US 
advocacy groups admit that they are primarily dependent on 
outside patronage for their funding (Walker, 1991).
Advocates for public health should also consider the use 
of ideological arguments. The claim that government should 
leave individuals and businesses to make their own accommo-
dations drew extensive public support, and if this argument is 
accepted, makes scientific evidence supporting measures to 
protect public health appear less important (Schattschneider, 
1969). Research on the use of ideological arguments in policy 
making suggests that industries rely on such claims to main-
tain a profitable status quo (Bero et al., 2001), so public health 
advocates should be prepared to address these kinds of ideolo-
gical claims directly (Cohen et al., 2000).
This research has certain limitations. The history of GGOOB 
is a single case study, and the tobacco industry in particular has 
an incentive to create front groups because it has historically 
been viewed as untrustworthy (Harris Poll, 1999; Roper Center, 
1999, 2000a and 2000b). In addition, the reliance on internal 
industry documents raises questions about the true influence 
of the organization in affecting the outcome of the FDA and 
OSHA regulatory battles. However, the substantial commit-
ment made by RJ Reynolds suggests that the coalition provided 
value to the tobacco industry.
The successful development of industry front groups such 
as GGOOB has implications beyond tobacco regulation. Similar 
public health issues arise in questions of food policy and obesi-
ty, pharmaceutical regulation, limitations on the production of 
oil and gas, and attempts to control pollutants. Organizations 
learn from each other (Apollonio and La Raja, 2004; March 
and Olsen, 1984), other industries facing new restrictions have 
developed similar kinds of front groups to advocate on their 
behalf (Mitchell, 2002; Public Citizen, 2001). However, unlike 
the tobacco industry, few of these other industries have been 
required to release internal documents that would reveal the 
creation of front groups. Lacking this kind of information, po-
licymakers and advocates should research newly formed coali-
tions, as well as extrapolate from evidence provided by descrip-
tions of tobacco industry activity obtained by looking through 
the “keyhole” of internal industry documents.
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